




INSPECTOR GENERAL

U.S. Department of Defense

OCTOBER 31, 2014



Evaluation of DoD Intelligence Training and Education Programs for the Fundamental Competencies of the DoD Intelligence Workforce

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Results in Brief

Evaluation of DoD Intelligence Training and Education Programs for the Fundamental Competencies of the DoD Intelligence Workforce

October 31, 2014

Objective

(U) The overall objective was to evaluate how effective and efficient DoD intelligence training and education programs are in meeting the fundamental competencies of the DoD intelligence workforce and to identify best practices for standardization in the DoD Intelligence Enterprise. Specifically, we evaluated the training standards, policies, and, entry-level training curriculums for the DoD intelligence functional areas of the DoD intelligence workforce.

Findings

(U) The DoD Intelligence Enterprise lacks intelligence training program standards for the common training needs and developmental skills. The military services and agencies in the DoD Intelligence Enterprise each have varying processes for providing intelligence training and education to the intelligence workforce. As a result of the absence of DoD Intelligence Enterprise standards, the DoD developmental intelligence training program has a fragmented training structure, varying proficiency levels, training redundancy, and critical skill gaps.

(U) DoD currently does not have the structure, resources and capability to provide an efficient DoD Joint Intelligence Training and professionalization program for the DoD intelligence workforce. Joint Intelligence Training functions and responsibilities were not fully transferred to the designated DoD organizations after the disestablishment of U.S. Joint Forces Command in 2010.

Findings (cont'd)

(U) As a result, the DoD Intelligence Enterprise has critical skill gaps and the Joint Intelligence Training program is not compliant with applicable regulations and guidance.

(U) Many of the issues identified were similarly reflected in organizational internal and external review results, demonstrating that DoD is aware of the training issues and has taken steps to address the situation.

Recommendations

(U) We recommend that the Director, Human Capital Management Office, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (HCMO), examine the current DoD intelligence training and education policies and mandate as necessary, standards based on a common essential body of knowledge and essential body of work for all entry-level/developmental intelligence professionals. Develop, implement and codify in DoD policy, the oversight responsibilities of the training solutions that support DoD validated developmental level skill standards.

(U) We recommend that the Director, Joint Staff identify a Joint Intelligence Training Program Management Office, to conduct a comprehensive assessment of the program to establish standards, a baseline and plan for the existing capabilities and gaps in alignment with Joint Intelligence Training policies and requirements.

Management Comments and Our Response

(U) Both the Director, HCMO, and the Director, Joint Staff concurred with the findings and suggested language rewording to our recommendations. We considered Management comments and changed the recommendations where appropriate. We also requested Management provide a plan of actions and milestones for implementation. Please see the recommendations table on the of this page for our request for additional comments.

Recommendations Table

Management	Recommendations Requiring Comment	No Additional Comments Required
Director, Human Capital Management Office, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence	A.1., A.2.	
Director, Joint Staff	B.1., B.2., B.3.	

Please provide comments by November 30, 2014.

OCT 31 2014



**INSPECTOR GENERAL
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
4800 MARK CENTER DRIVE
ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA 22350-1500**

**MEMORANDUM FOR: DIRECTOR, JOINT STAFF
DIRECTOR, HUMAN CAPITAL MANAGEMENT OFFICE, OFFICE OF
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE**

**SUBJECT: (U) Evaluation of DoD Intelligence Training and Education Programs for the
Fundamental Competencies of the DoD Intelligence Workforce
(Report No. DODIG-2015-015)**

(U) We are providing this report for your information and use. We considered management comments on a draft of this report when preparing the final report.

(U) DoD Directive 7650.3 requires that all recommendations be resolved promptly. Comments from Director, Human Capital Management Office, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and the Director, Joint Chiefs of Staff were in concurrence with our findings and both provided input for our recommendations. We considered management comments and changed the recommendations where appropriate. We also requested management provide additional comments to include a plan of actions and milestones (POA&M) to identify how the recommendations will be implemented. We request POA&M on Recommendations A.1., A.2., B.1., B.2., and B.3. as indicated in the recommendations table on page ii by November 30, 2014.

(U) If possible, send your comments in electronic format (Adobe Acrobat file only). Copies of your comments must have the actual signature of the authorizing official for your organization. We are unable to accept the /Signed/ symbol in place of the actual signature.

(U) We appreciate the courtesies extended to the staff. Please direct questions to me at (703) 699-7430 (DSN 499-7430).

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Anthony C. Thomas", written over a circular stamp or seal.

**Anthony C. Thomas
Deputy Inspector General
for Intelligence and
Special Program Assessments**

cc: Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

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Acronyms and Abbreviations

Introduction

Objective

(U) Our objective was to evaluate how effective and efficient DoD intelligence training and education programs are in meeting the fundamental/core competencies¹ of the DoD intelligence workforce and to identify best practices for standardization in the DoD Intelligence Enterprise. Specifically, we evaluated the training standards, policies, and, entry-level training curriculums for the DoD intelligence functional areas² of the DoD Intelligence and Security Enterprise³ (DoD IE).

Background

(U) According to DoDD 1400.35 Defense Civilian Intelligence Personnel System, September 1, 2009 and DoDD 5143.01, Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence November 23, 2005, the DoD IE is comprised of the following DoD intelligence components and the intelligence elements of the Active and Reserve components of the Military Departments that perform national intelligence, Defense Intelligence, and intelligence-related functions:

- Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence
- United States Army
- United States Navy
- United States Air Force
- United States Coast Guard
- United States Marine Corps
- Defense Intelligence Agency
- National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency
- National Reconnaissance Office
- National Reconnaissance Office
- National Security Agency/Central Security Service

¹ Intelligence Community Directive 610 defines “competencies” as the measurable or observable knowledge, skills, abilities, behaviors, and other characteristics needed to perform a type of work or function; and defines “core” as competencies that apply universally to all Intelligence Community employees regardless of agency or element, mission category, occupational group, or work category.

² Intelligence Functional Areas : Analysis, Collection Management, Counterintelligence, Cryptology, Cyber, Human Intelligence, Foreign Disclosure, General Intelligence, Geospatial Intelligence, Joint Intelligence, Measurement and Signals Intelligence, Open Source Intelligence and Security.

³ DoD Intelligence Training and Education Board defines “DoD Intelligence and Security Enterprise” to describe intelligence and security components within military and intelligence agencies.

(U) For the purposes of this report, we use “DoD IE training officials” to define the senior officials and representatives we collected data from or interviewed from the organizations and offices of the above listed intelligence components. See Appendix A: Scope and Methodology for a specific listing of the offices and elements of those organizations.

(U) Each DoD IE component has its own respective missions, requirements and capabilities with the goal to train and educate its intelligence professionals⁴ in accordance with national, DoD, and Service-specific or intelligence agency training guidance and regulations. The DoD IE’s multiple training processes created distinct differences on how each component addressed its own intelligence training and education requirements, in addition to the requirements of the DoD IE and the Intelligence Community (IC). U.S. forces are employed across the range of military operations, most of which will be conducted in an interagency and multinational partner environment. Therefore, DoD IE must equip its workforce with the necessary developmental intelligence skills and knowledge to fulfill respective organizational mission objectives and operate in a joint, interagency, multinational, and intergovernmental environment.

Director of National Intelligence

(U) Under Section 5 of Executive Order 13355, “Strengthened Control of Standards and Qualifications,” September 1, 2004, the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) is authorized to issue standards and qualifications for persons engaged in the performance of U.S. intelligence activities, including, but not limited to, standards for training, education, and career development of personnel assigned to the IC. The DNI is also responsible for ensuring compatibility between personnel policies and an integrated professional development and education system, including standards in multiple organizations of the IC. The Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) issued Intelligence Community Directive 610, “Competency Directories for the Intelligence Community Workforce,” October 4, 2010, to establish an IC-wide policy to identify and define departmental, independent agency, and component-specific competencies. In addition, the directive establishes a uniform competency nomenclature, including standard labels and definitions for describing IC workforce capabilities. The ODNI competencies provided guidance to develop intelligence training for general professional skill sets. Though the ODNI competencies were based on basic knowledge sets of the intelligence disciplines and job specialties, they did not provide common standards for developmental skill sets and basic knowledge of an IC professional.

⁴ We define “Intelligence Professionals” as Technicians and Administrative Support personnel whose primary responsibilities include conducting and supporting intelligence operations and functions for the mission of an organizational unit. Qualifications generally are acquired through practical experience, supplemented by on-the-job or skills-specific training.

Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence

(U) The USD(I) memorandum “Strategic Management of the Defense Intelligence Enterprise Workforce”, October 12, 2011, identified “developing and maintaining a highly-skilled, mission-aligned and diverse DoD IE to meet the evolving scope and complexity of threats challenging our nation” among his priorities for the Strategic Management of the Defense Intelligence Enterprise Workforce. The USD(I) priorities included acquiring and developing the workforce, to ensure that the enterprise has the necessary capabilities to meet the present-day mission objectives and to ensure future investments in training and education to address the most critical skill gaps.

Human Capital Management Office

(U) DoD Instruction (DoDI) 3115.11, “DoD Intelligence Human Capital Management Operations,” January 22, 2009 (Incorporating Change 1, December 9, 2011), established policy, prescribed procedures, and assigned responsibilities to develop and execute DoD Intelligence Human Capital Programs. The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (OUSD(I)) assigned the responsibility of providing oversight and developing human capital policies and guidance for education, training, and career development in the DoD IE to the Human Capital Management Office (HCMO), OUSD(I). The HCMO was established to ensure integration of defense intelligence training with other DoD training in DoD and the IC, while working to professionalize the workforce with nationally accredited certification programs.

DoD Intelligence Training and Education Board

(U) The OUSD(I) established the DoD Intelligence Training and Education Board (DITEB) in the HCMO to conduct policy coordination and oversight on defense intelligence workforce development, training, and education matters. The DITEB provides strategic leadership and a forum to collaboratively organize and integrate training, education, and professional development initiatives for efficient and effective learning in the DoD intelligence and security enterprise. DITEB also makes recommendations and provide input to the USD(I) for policy changes, establishment of standards, allocation of responsibilities, and other related topics. DITEB meetings are held at least bi-monthly or as members determine. DITEB members include intelligence training and education leadership from the DoD IE, the chairs of the training councils listed in each of the established functional intelligence training policies, and non-Defense intelligence components.

Finding A

Lack of DoD Intelligence Basic/Developmental Training Program Standards

(U) The DoD Intelligence Enterprise (DoD IE) lacks programmatic standards that address common training needs to develop proficiency levels and skills of intelligence professionals in the enterprise. The military services and agencies in the DoD IE each have varying structures and processes for intelligence training and education, with no common standards to develop the fundamental skills of their military and civilian intelligence workforce. As a result, the developmental training⁵ program has widely divergent standards, difficulties in performing common tasks in an integrated fashion, fragmented training structures, varying proficiency levels, training redundancy, and critical skill gaps.

⁵ During the review, we determined that the DoD IE used various terms such as basic, entry level, ascension, fundamental, foundation, and core training to describe initial training for the DoD intelligence workforce. However, this report, in accordance with the Intelligence Community Directive 652, April 28, 2012, we use the term “developmental training” to define initial training of fundamental skills and concepts to acquire the core competencies of the DoD IE.

Intelligence Training Issues

(U) DoD IE training officials’ interviews, along with reporting of the status of Intelligence Training from the IC and DoD IE, all highlight the need for intelligence training standards and certification. The reoccurring intelligence training issues identified include the following:

- The lack of uniform DoD IE Training and Education standards makes intelligence training alignment difficult regarding how training is developed, advertised, assigned, resourced, shared, delivered, and managed.
- The high priority of training and readiness demands for deployment hampered DoD IE’s ability to develop training and update doctrine linked to training requirements and objectives. Specifically, the introduction of new subject areas/capabilities during a time of static or decreasing resources led to DoD IE’s challenges in updating training requirements.
- The complexity of training processes and constraints on training timeframes limit and direct the content of the training courses.

Governance

(U) DoD IE training programs have several points-of-origin (for example, DoD Directives, Stakeholder/Customer Requests, Functional Manager Compliance Requirements, and mission competencies). The DoD training governance structure is organized by intelligence function (such as Human Intelligence, Geospatial Intelligence and Signals Intelligence). There is no distinct governance body or mechanism chartered to establish a common developmental level knowledge and skill standard across all functional areas. No single training management system exists to gain a comprehensive view of developmental intelligence training for the DoD IE and IC. It is difficult for the DoD IE to construct a standardized DoD IE basic intelligence training plan because of the varied and complex structures of the training programs. Also, the DITEB had difficulty conducting sufficient oversight of the development and efficiency of DoD IE training programs, providing guidance to modify current training to meet updated requirements, and projecting future requirements and workforce needs.

Requirements

(U) Continuous overseas deployments, a broader range of missions, and competition for resources resulted in training programs that are not aligned with requirements and competencies, and are less than optimal for mission needs. The DoD IE received additional and complex training requirements and new subject areas/capabilities while their resources remained static or decreased. In some cases, course developmental intelligence training requirements were not updated and core competencies did not reflect current knowledge identified from recent field activities and missions. The absence of a governance body to establish and manage common developmental-level standards hinders the ability of the military services and agencies of the DoD IE training community to update the curricula with current information and perform common tasks in an integrated fashion.

(U) DoD IE training officials recommended that the DoD IE focus training development on what is needed in the field and link it to training requirements and objectives. Additionally, they remarked that training efforts should focus on the skill set or capability needed instead of the core task because the task will sometimes differ. Also, learning or training specific topics and skill sets at a certain proficiency level need to occur at the most appropriate time in the careers of intelligence professionals to ensure they can retain knowledge and use skills sets where and when needed.

Processes

(U) DoD IE current training programs, processes and developmental activities include in-depth structured courses and cover a wide range of content from tradecraft to basic (entry-level), mid-level, and advanced skills and knowledge. Accordingly, each Intelligence Functional Manager has established standards required for each functional mission or tradecraft and has mandated that the Services train to those standards. For instance, there are specific training requirements for an Imagery Analyst that differ from those of a Human Intelligence or Counterintelligence professional. DoD IE leadership stated that the DoD IE intelligence training program lacks uniformity in providing consistent access to basic and follow-up courses for intelligence professionals. Each organization has its own internal system and business process which may or may not be compatible with other internal or external training offices. Courses are often developed based on limited timeframes, with little or no flexibility for increasing training time allotted for courses when additional training requirements are introduced.

(U) DoD IE training officials stated that the length of courses depend on whether the necessary resources exist. Resources to train were limited by current existing budgetary, instructor, and support personnel constraints. Additionally, the student training throughput time-line was limited not to exceed a certain amount of days (to include end-strength disposition-requirement to train personnel to perform the mission at a certain proficiency level). New personnel spend most of their initial enlistment or career segment in training to develop and obtain basic knowledge and skill sets. Therefore, most training events are planned and designed within certain time constraints because overall training decreases in the time personnel actually perform the mission.

(U) DoD IE's and IC's high priority issues drive the capabilities assigned for personnel, training, and resources. For instance, the current "Growth Industries" or high priority capabilities are Space, Intelligence and Cyber; therefore, DoD IE will ensure the appropriate amount of resources is provided to train the intelligence workforce to meet the current capability need. In order to expand course content to include new training requirements and accommodate the course timeframe, the course content is reprioritized or reduced. Shifts in capability emphasis reduced training time, or in some cases led to completely abandoning the instruction of a capability to allot for time to train the new capability in the training-time confines. However, DoD IE training officials stated that it is debatable whether extending programs of instruction actually lead to better knowledge retention or skill development. DoD IE leadership agreed there should be a balance in updating training content while preserving critical fundamental skillsets and knowledge base.

DoD Fundamental/Basic Intelligence Training Program

(U) While DoD IE training programs have a long established history, IC and DoD intelligence competencies are a relatively new concept that emerged in the last decade. Subsequently, in the absence of DoD IE common standards, programs, and structure, each DoD intelligence component responsible for an intelligence functional area created courses independently and without oversight from the HCMO, USD(I). DoD IE training officials confirmed that DoD lacked developmental training program standards for both military and civilian intelligence professionals. There is no DoD intelligence training management system to provide a comprehensive view of an intelligence professional's training linked to a career roadmap and competencies. Additionally, no standard or mechanism exists to identify, align, and prescribe the proficiency level and the basic intelligence skills training necessary for mission requirements. The absence of a DoD IE training management system and standards resulted, at times, in the inability of intelligence professionals to develop competencies needed for professional development, varying proficiency levels, and redundant training in the DoD IE.

(U) DoD IE training officials stated that civilian and military training standards are not complementary. Specifically, the military has more uniformity with standards in DoD IE regarding career specialties, but there is no uniformity between DoD IE or civilian professionals' standards of training. For instance, a military intelligence professional follows a training curriculum that is aligned with the respective military service career/rank progression. Military professionals primarily received their initial intelligence training at a military training facility and took follow-on career enhancing training on-line, on-the-job, or on-site. The structure ensures that military intelligence personnel complete service specific training standards which are linked directly to promotion for rank, but not necessarily to DoD IE competencies. In contrast, many civilian intelligence professionals received their foundational intelligence training through prior military experience, college, on-the-job experience, and organizational needs through a combination of DoD IE classroom and online courses, also not necessarily linked to DoD IE competencies.

(U) Overall, DoD IE training officials stated that the developmental intelligence training prepared intelligence professionals for a basic level understanding of the various entry/developmental level responsibilities required of their respective service or agency. However, varying training content also created challenges to establish career roadmaps linked to requisite training necessary for alignment with mission requirements, professional development, and building competencies to include skills necessary for strategic or joint assignments.

(U) Military intelligence professionals and civilian intelligence professionals receive, in some instances, a mandatory block of standardized developmental intelligence training. This instruction is provided at Goodfellow, Air Force Base, the National Security Agency, the Office of Naval Intelligence, or at the U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence. Among the remaining DoD IE components, the entry-level intelligence training was not standardized or mandatory, and depended on intelligence function or job specialty or status of military or civilian personnel. The components used a combination of internally-developed courses and workshops and external/vendor-supplied training opportunities for entry-level, journeyman, and intermediate intelligence professionals. Additionally, training officials explained that the type of courses and content included in the curriculum for each intelligence functional area depended on the expected proficiency level, mission area, and requirements levied from the functional managers. Some DoD IE components partnered with counterparts to develop, leverage, and provide developmental training. DoD IE training officials agreed that though many variables exist that determine the course content, all intelligence professionals should have training to provide for common foundational skill sets, and a knowledge base.

(U) The Table below illustrates a “Best Practice” model of the types of courses that were commonly identified throughout our project as developmental training courses currently provided or should be considered for inclusion in a DoD IE common developmental intelligence training block of instruction.

(U) Table - DoD IE Common Intelligence Developmental skills areas and courses

Knowledge/Skill Area	Courses	
Security	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Safety for Intelligence Professionals • Security Basic Facts & Terms • Intelligence Oversight • Information Security 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Operations Security • Physical Security • Safeguarding Classified Information: Document Marking, Control, Destruction requirements
Organizations & Missions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Intelligence Organizations and Missions • U.S. and Friendly Force Familiarization 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Geography (Combatant Commands) • DoD History and Culture
Intelligence Disciplines	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Basic facts and terms of: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • All-Source Analysis • Collection Management • Counterintelligence • Cryptology • Cyber • Human Intelligence • Foreign Disclosure 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • General Intelligence • Geospatial Intelligence • Joint Intelligence • Measurement and Signals Intelligence • Open Source Intelligence • Security

Knowledge/Skill Area	Courses	
Doctrine	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Intelligence Law • National Policies • DoD Policies and Guidance 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Service/Agency Policies and Guidance
Tradecraft/Skills	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Critical Thinking • Basic Intelligence Tools • (Research, investigative resources, online data search) • Basic Intelligence Writing • Basic Intelligence Briefing • Intelligence Community Lexicon 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment • Regional and Cultural Awareness • Problem Solving Structured Analysis

OUSD(I) Intelligence Training Efforts

(U) Since 2007, DITEB has developed DoD IE oversight measures to include the DITEB annual report and Staff Assistance Visits to the intelligence schoolhouses in order to monitor the progress and status of DoD IE intelligence training. OUSD(I) HCMO has developed the DoD 3305 series training, education, professional development and certification policy and guidance issuances that are focused on developing DoD IE community training and certification standards (see Annex D). These series of issuances established policy, standards, and procedures and assigned responsibilities for conducting training for specific intelligence functional areas. Additionally, the DITEB continually coordinates with DoD IE training officials and Intelligence Functional Managers to implement those standards and encourage collaboration and sharing between the components and the IC. However, these efforts did not provide an overall solution for the challenges identified to include:

- (U) alignment of training and professional development efforts with mission requirements;
- (U) the lack of a DoD IE collaborative assessment tool to track training proficiency; and
- (U) the fact that intelligence professionals lack the necessary developmental skills and knowledge base to meet the evolving demands and requirements of the DoD IE.

(U) The OUSD(I) focused efforts for training, education, and professional development standards through policies aligned with functional missions. Specifically, the DITEB drafted six DoD intelligence training standards through a collaborative working-level process. The draft standards are informally being adopted by DoD IE components and will be formally implemented using DoD policy procedures. These standards focused on areas of professional development to include:

- (U) a common framework of intelligence workforce professional development;
- (U) a reference guide of consolidated Lexicon of Intelligence Learning to ensure that all individuals working on professional development in the community uses the same terms when naming their learning organization's analysis, design, development, implementation, and evaluation activities;
- (U) the accreditation of intelligence schoolhouses;
- (U) the certification of instructors;
- (U) the implementation of best practices in instructional systems design for intelligence training content; and
- (U) an evaluation framework for training.

(U) The OUSD(I) instituted accreditation and certification procedures⁶ for the intelligence functional areas and will move to certification of the intelligence workforce. The professional certification program was designed as a tool for carrying out the DoD IE functional managers' authority to potentially attain training efficiencies through establishing standards for professional knowledge, skills, and practice and aligning them with mission requirements. DoD IE training officials stated that though the program establishes professional knowledge and skill bases for functional areas, the program lacks a baseline for the fundamental basic skill sets of intelligence professionals. (See Appendix C for additional information on the certification programs.)

⁶ USD(I) memorandum, "Strategic Management of the Defense Intelligence Enterprise Workforce," October 12, 2011; DITEB Guide, "Development and Management of a Nationally Accredited Professional Certification Program-A Guide for Intelligence and Security Community Certification Programs", May 24, 2012.

Conclusion

(U) Continuous overseas deployments, a broader range of missions, and competition for resources over the past decade have created operational challenges for the DoD IE that include reduced training timeframes, increased mission requirements and demand for shared resources. In order to meet the needs of a dynamic, continually changing operational environment, and equip the DoD intelligence workforce with the necessary capabilities to achieve mission requirements, DoD's intelligence training and professional development must be aligned with competencies that are linked to DoD IE requirements. Also, DOD developmental intelligence training programs must be current, congruent, and consistently meet stakeholder's verified training and professional development requirements.

(U) The DoD IE is aware of the intelligence training issues identified and have taken efforts to improve them. But the process for training and certifying developmental skill sets of intelligence professionals remains fragmentary with no standardization for establishing a baseline to measure present-day results against future results. Both organizational differences and commonalities exist between intelligence components and their approach to training and education. However, DoD IE components did not effectively allocate resources, leverage commonalities and best practices. In some cases, the absence of DoD IE training standards resulted in intelligence professionals with differing levels of proficiency, and a lack of the necessary developmental skills and knowledge base to meet DoD's evolving demands and requirements.

Recommendation, Management Comments, and Our Response

Recommendation A.1

(U) We recommend that the Director, Human Capital Management Office, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence:

1. **(U) Examine the current DoD intelligence training and education policies and mandate as necessary, standards based on a common essential body of knowledge and essential body of work for all entry-level/developmental intelligence professionals.**
2. **(U) Develop, implement and codify in DoD policy, as necessary, the responsibilities to manage and oversee the design, development, delivery, assessment and maintenance of developmental-level training solutions that support DoD validated developmental level skill standards for entry-level/developmental intelligence professionals.**

Human Capital Management Office, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Response

(U) The Director, HCMO concurred with our findings and suggested language rewording for our recommendations.

Our Response

(U) The Director, HCMO was responsive to our recommendations. However, we request HCMO management provide a plan of actions and milestones (POA&M) for implementation of the recommendations. Management also requested rewording the language in the recommendation to align with the current intelligence and education program methodology; and proposed an additional study to validate our findings. We partially agreed with the proposed rewording. Since Management concurred with our findings, an additional study to validate our findings is not necessary. We do agree that management coordination with the DoD components to determine the impact of the findings and develop and establish entry/developmental-level skill standards is warranted. We request management provide additional comments that include a POA&M for the implementation of recommendations by November 30, 2014.

Finding B

The Joint Intelligence Training Program Lacks Governance and Structure

(U) DoD currently lacks the structure, resources, and capability to provide DoD Joint Intelligence Training (JIT) and a professionalization program for the DoD intelligence workforce. JIT functions and responsibilities were not fully transferred to designated DoD organizations after the disestablishment of U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) in 2010. As a result, the DoD IE has critical skill gaps and the JIT program is not compliant with applicable regulations and guidance. Additionally, DoD intelligence components are conducting minimal JIT and are not fully leveraging joint collective training events or exercises to train their intelligence personnel.

Joint Intelligence Training Guidance

(U) U.S. forces may be employed across the range of military operations, most of which will be conducted in an interagency and multinational partner environment. Therefore, DoD must prepare its workforce to operate in a joint, interagency, multinational, and intergovernmental environment. JIT as defined by DoD Instruction 3305.14, "Joint Intelligence Training," January 28, 2013, is "Fundamental training that guides the development and utilization of intelligence professionals and organizations designed to support two or more Services employed in coordinated action." The challenge identified in our evaluation is for JIT to be responsive to the needs of the DoD IE for all operations.

(U) According to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) Instruction 3500.01G, "Joint Training Policy and Guidance for the Armed Forces of the United States," March 2012, "The authority for conducting joint training evolved from the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, Public Law 99-433."

(U) Title 10 U.S.C., section 153(a) as modified by Public Law 99-433, "Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, outlines the functions of the CJCS as responsible for "(1)Developing doctrine for the joint employment of the U.S. Armed Forces; (2) Formulating policies for the joint training of the U.S. Armed Forces; and(3) Formulating policies for coordinating the military education."

(U) Furthermore, Title 10 U.S.C., section 193, specifically states that in support of oversight of Combat support agencies the CJCS will, “(1) provide for the participation of the combat support agencies in joint training exercises to the extent necessary to ensure that those agencies are capable of performing their support missions with respect to a war or threat to national security and; (2) assess the performance in joint training exercises of each such agency and, in accordance with guidelines established by the Secretary of Defense, take steps to provide for any change that the Chairman considers appropriate to improve that performance.” Subsequent authorities (see Appendix D) for conducting JIT evolved from this law.

(U) “The Joint Training Vision of the Chairman’s Joint Training Policy and Guidance for the Armed Forces of the United States,” CJCS Instruction 3500.01G, March 2012 states: “Joint Training Vision-All individuals, units, and staffs required to conduct military operations will be trained, under realistic conditions and to exacting standards, prior to execution of those operations. Personnel selected for joint assignments will be trained prior to reaching their duty locations.”

(U) In 1998, CJCS established and designated USJFCOM as lead agent and single point of contact for the concept development of distributed joint doctrine/training and interoperability for U.S. Armed Forces. USJFCOM coordinated, consolidated, and maintained worldwide joint training support requirements and transformed requirements into a global distributed joint training architecture to support distributed joint training, as defined by the Combatant Commands (CCMD). As a subset of the larger responsibility for providing joint training and leading the collaborative development of joint training standards, processes, and programs, the Commander, USJFCOM, was also responsible for providing policies and procedures and assigning the responsibilities for planning, programming, and budgeting for how JIT is conducted. However, on August 16, 2010, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, issued the memorandum, “Guidance on DoD Efficiency Initiatives with Immediate Application,” August 20, 2010, that codified 20 initiatives to include USJFCOM’s closing.

~~(FOUO)~~ A temporary task force and “U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) Disestablishment Working Group” were established and were both tasked to develop a plan to support and ensure proper implementation of the overall transition. In accordance with applicable guidance, the “Disestablishment of the United States Joint Forces Command-Implementation Plan”, March 8, 2011, the disposition of the JIT functions and capabilities were as follows:

- (U) Transferred: The Joint Intelligence Exercise Training Function was directed to be transferred to the Deputy Director, Joint Staff, J7. The Function included providing intelligence planning, production, modeling and simulation, intelligence systems and manning for USJFCOM-supported exercises from initial concept through execution. However, the transfer did not occur.
- (U) Eliminated: Joint Intelligence Training (Standards) Function-Commander, USJFCOM, was assigned the responsibility to manage and lead the development of a JIT program capability that provides JIT program management, requirements and capabilities development, training development, execution and assessment, exercise planning, and execution and readiness reporting.
- (U) Eliminated: Joint Forces Intelligence School Function-Commanders of CCMDs, through CJCS, support and maximize using the Regional Joint Intelligence Training Facilities.

(U) However, the USJFCOM Director of Intelligence Memorandum, “Disestablishment of U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) Joint Intelligence Operations Center (JIOC),” stated that the following JIT missions and functions were “Transferred”:

- (U) Joint Forces Intelligence School and Joint Intelligence Training-Joint Management Office: Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and
- (U) Joint Intelligence Exercise Support: Joint Staff, Deputy Director, J7 (JS DD J7) Joint and Coalition Warfighting

Joint Intelligence Training Issues

(U) DoD IE training leadership identified and acknowledged the following issues were prevalent prior to and remained after the USJFCOM’s disestablishment:

- (U) Lack of oversight and management of the JIT program in DoD. Due to a lack of JIT personnel designated to manage and lead the developing of a JIT program capability;
- (U) Lack of DoD IE JIT program processes, standards, and requirements; and
- (U) The JIT enterprise is not conducting joint intelligence training consistent with the joint training guidance through the cumulative and progressive integration of joint training for individual, staff/functional, and collective missions.

Governance and Structure

(U) Though JFCOM was disestablished in 2011, the DoD Instruction 3305.14, “Joint Intelligence Training”, January 28, 2013, “Assigns the Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) the responsibility for JIT”, and “Assigns the Commander, USJFCOM, the responsibility for implementing JIT for the Joint Intelligence Operations Centers (JIOCs).” The intelligence training officials of the Joint Staff (JS), J25-7 reported that following USJFCOM’s disestablishment, no singular entity was clearly identified to oversee and manage the DoD JIT program, due in part to a lack of resources. Specifically, the lack of resources include eliminating and/ or not transferring billets to the JS upon USJFCOM’s disestablishment; and also, as illustrated above, the conflicting disestablishment guidance provided to the DoD IE. The J25-7 intelligence training officials stated that it was aware per Title 10, SEC 153, that the CJCS is ultimately responsible for joint doctrine, training and education, and these functions are carried out through JS as the process owner for each function. However, the CJCS relies on the appropriate JS directorate to provide substantive expertise for their particular functional area. For example, JS Intelligence, J-2 is the joint intelligence doctrine sponsor, but the Joint Force Development, J-7, leads the joint doctrine development process. Similarly, Joint Force Development, J-7, has overall responsibility for joint training and exercises, but JS Intelligence, J-2, is responsible for leading intelligence support to joint exercises.

(U) The leadership of the Office of Training, Education, and Development and the Training Task Force Team, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), stated that DIA lacks a Joint Forces Intelligence School and Joint Intelligence Training-Joint Management Office, that was mandated to be transferred to DIA per the guidance of the USJFCOM disestablishment memorandum. DIA does however; include the following schools with a Joint focus: Joint Counterintelligence Training Academy, Joint Military Attaché School, and Joint Military Intelligence Training Center. However, these schools do not carry out the functions of the disestablished Joint Forces Intelligence School.

(U) The Director, DIA, under the authority, direction, and control of the USD(I), is the functional manager of DoD IE Counterintelligence, Human Intelligence and General Intelligence training, responsible for issuing guidance and prescribing training standards as defined by USD(I). DIA intelligence training leadership acknowledged that the DIA training organization historically has not linked fully with the Joint Training System, a process and tool designed to ensure readiness by defining the required level of resources and performance; executing training programs to improve performance; and assess levels of performance relative to

(U) mission capability requirements. Also, the DIA intelligence training leadership stated it needs to improve its integration with the Joint Training System. Ultimately, DIA and USD(I) intelligence training leadership stated they will leverage professional intelligence functional JIT certification (A DoD Instruction has been drafted and is undergoing DoD staff coordination for approval) to ensure JIT standards are identified and implemented.

Processes, Standards and Requirements

(U) DOD IE training leadership stated that they found performing JIT and joint service work to be difficult. They explained that components are challenged with alignment with the CCMDs and their Joint Mission Essential Task List due to a lack of updated and fully implemented Agency Mission Essential Task Lists, joint training events, training linked to component mission requirements, and competencies identified for strategic or joint assignments. Combat Support Agencies review their Agency Mission-Essential Task Lists to ensure alignment with CCMDs' Joint Mission-Essential Task List (usually done through joint training events) to accomplish this task. Specifically, leadership of the Office of Training, Education, and Development and the Training Task Force Team, DIA stated that though they have updated their Agency Mission-Essential Task Lists, carrying out the tasks is progressing slowly due to a lack of an established training plan coordinated with DoD IE training representatives. Aligning training governance in the DOD IE with Joint Mission-Essential task Lists is critical to developing efficient training in accordance with mission capability requirements. The services and agencies need to establish and develop requirements to appropriately align their training to match what the personnel will actually need to know to perform their duties and functions that are assigned to them in a joint operational environment.

(U) DoD IE intelligence training officials explained that CCMDs do not establish and provide specific requirements for personnel aligned with mission and needs of the organization. Most of the requirements are informally tasked and requested. The DoD IE is confused about the definition of "Joint Intelligence." Therefore, JIT is conducted without common DoD IE standards as the foundation to develop a JIT program that maximizes efficiency and minimizes confusion.

(U) Full-time participation by DoD IE military and agency representatives to assist with the Joint Force Development, J7, process is extremely limited. Every JIT stakeholder organization needs to identify personnel that are knowledgeable of current joint intelligence operations and joint doctrine to better support the joint intelligence doctrine development process. The JIT program requires the appropriate personnel capacity and capability to conduct training development, execution and assessment; program and requirements management; exercise planning and execution; and readiness reporting.

DoD IE JIT Program Activities

(U) In 2009, USJFCOM JIT-Joint Management Office conducted a comprehensive review of the Status of the DoD IE JIT program and reported its findings and recommendations in the “Joint Intelligence Training FY10 Annual Report,” January 19, 2011. The findings and recommendations were consistent with those identified through interviews and research in support of this evaluation. Absent a DoD JIT management and oversight entity, DoD components are conducting minimal JIT and are not fully leveraging joint collective training events or exercises to train their intelligence personnel. While previous efforts to field a structured JIT and professionalization program have continued for at least eight years, carrying out JIT requirements and improvements have progressed slowly and are incomplete. DoD IE leadership stated that it conducts JIT sparingly and without a DoD IE JIT program plan.

Conclusion

(U) The “JIT Program Plan-Defense Intelligence Guidance for FY2009-2014,” June 4, 2007, stated

“Full operating capability for the JIT JMO [Joint Management Office] Program is defined as follows: a universally accepted Joint Intelligence Training and Education Program with global execution through a Joint Intelligence Training Capability which is administered to published standards and addresses all types of training (individual, staff or functional and collective) at all levels of war (strategic to tactical) in order to maintain a consistent application of joint intelligence support to the warfighter.”

(U) After USJFCOM’s disestablishment, JIT capabilities were reduced and, in some cases terminated, which resulted in the degradation of the DoD IE’s ability to execute a JIT program in accordance with JIT doctrine and mission needs. The JS must resolve CCMD, Combat Support Agency, Military Services, Interagency and Coalition joint or combined training and exercises issues; and develop Courses of Actions and obtain Force Development leadership guidance to provide efficient JIT to the DoD JIT enterprise. The DoD JIT enterprise must identify the lead element or organization in DoD and clearly provide guidance for JIT program authorities, requirements, management, and oversight. Also, before management and oversight of the JIT program can occur, the JIT enterprise must mitigate the loss of USJFCOM JIT-Management Office and Joint Forces Intelligence School through a baseline of JIT enterprise-wide performance and alignment against DoD IE programs and requirements, existing capabilities, challenges, and solutions in order to meet the objectives of the JIT regulations and guidance.

Recommendation, Management Comments, and Our Response

Recommendation B

(U) We recommend Director, Joint Staff:

1. **(U) Identify and codify in the appropriate regulations roles, responsibilities, and standards for the lead elements or organizations of primary responsibility in DoD IE to govern and execute the management and oversight of the Joint Intelligence Training program, policies, plans and doctrine.**
2. **(U) Establish standards for evaluating the development, implementation, performance, and efficiency of the DoD Intelligence Enterprise Joint Intelligence Training program in accordance with mission needs, competencies, and proficiency level requirements.**
3. **(U) Conduct a comprehensive assessment of the DoD Joint Intelligence Training program to establish a baseline and plan for capabilities, performance, and gaps in alignment with DoD Joint Intelligence Training program requirements.**

Joint Staff Comments

(U) Director, Joint Staff concurred with our findings and recommendations; and provided language rewording for our recommendations.

Our Response

(U) We agreed with the Director, Joint Staff comments. Additionally, Management proposed language rewording on page 12, Recommendation A.1., directed to the Director, HCMO. We considered Joint Staff (and OUSD(I)) comments (to this recommendation) and made changes where appropriate. And we recommend the most effective method to achieve the outcomes requested in our recommendations is to adhere to the current respective authorities and responsibilities of the agencies that govern DoD Intelligence Training and Education. Specifically, DoDI 3305.14, "Joint Intelligence Training," December 28, 2007 (Incorporating Change 2, October 15, 2013) states, USD(I) shall, "Provide policy, guidance, and oversight to JIT"; and assigns "Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) the responsibility for JIT, as a subset of the larger responsibility for providing joint training and leading the collaborative development of joint training standards, processes, and programs." The policy also states, Commander, USJFCOM, through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall, "Develop recommended program roles, responsibilities, and authorities for implementing key components of the program"; "Develop recommended program roles, responsibilities, and authorities

(U) for implementing key components of the program”; and “Develop JIT standards for use in certification and accreditation.” Since JFCOM was disestablished, DoDI 3305.14 should be updated to identify the lead elements or organizations of primary responsibility in DoD IE to govern and execute the management and oversight of the Joint Intelligence Training program, policies, plans and doctrine.

(U) Director, Joint Staff comments were responsive to our recommendations. However, we request Management provide additional comments that include plan of actions and milestones (POA&M) for implementation of the recommendations by November 30, 2014.

Appendix A

Scope and Methodology

What We Did

(U) We conducted this evaluation from May, 2013, to February, 2014, In accordance with Council of the Inspector's General on Integrity and Efficiency, Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation, Jan 2012. To meet our evaluation objective, we met with representatives of intelligence training and education and manpower, policy and plans at the:

- (U) Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence: Human Capital Management Office; and Defense Intelligence Training and Education Board”
- (U) Joint Chiefs of Staff: Joint Staff, J25-7; Plans, Exercises and Doctrine Division; and Intelligence Planning Division
- (U) United States Army: Department of Army Military Intelligence-Operations, Deputy Chief of Staff, G-2; and the offices of Chief of staff, Training, Development, and Support, and 111th Military Intelligence Brigade, US Army Intelligence Center of Excellence
- (U) United States Navy: Office of Naval Intelligence (OPNAV N2N61); IDC Military Manpower, Education & Training Advisory Department, Office of Naval Intelligence (N2/N6); Center for Information Dominance, Corry Station; and the Office of Naval Intelligence, for Intelligence Oversight and External Oversight
- (U) United States Air Force: Air Force Education and Training Command Headquarters; Air Force Intelligence Surveillance Reconnaissance Agency, A3T, Force Development Training; and the 17th Training Group, Goodfellow Air Force Base
- (U) United States Marine Corps: Intelligence Manpower and Training, Headquarters, United States Marine Corps, Intelligence Department
- (U) Defense Intelligence Agency: Office of Training, Education and Development, Training Support and Directorate for Analysis; the Task Force Training Led; and the Directorate for Analytic Resources Research
- (U) National Geospatial-Intelligence Office: Human Development Directorate; and Intelligence Oversight program and training, Office of General Counsel
- (U) National Security Agency/Central Security Service: Associate Directorate for Education and Training National Security Agency
- (U) Defense, Security Service: Center for Development of Security Excellence

(U) We interviewed organization representatives from the above listed offices to gather information on intelligence fundamental competency training and policy issues related to entry-level intelligence professionals. We applied applicable documentation, including policies, regulatory guidance and procedures for developing, maintaining, and overseeing DoD intelligence training to ascertain the status of the training in addressing the common needs and developmental skills requirements of intelligence professionals in the DoD IE. We analyzed curriculum data to identify commonalities among the courses in the basic/foundational intelligence training curriculum; however, we did not conduct a comprehensive review of the course content.

Scope Limitation

(U) We coordinated with representatives from the Office of Strategic Human Capital, National Reconnaissance Office. The National Reconnaissance Office had limited participation in this evaluation. The representatives stated that “The National Reconnaissance Office does not own its workforce. The DoD parent organizations that have personnel at the National Reconnaissance Office would be the office that would participate in this evaluation.”

Appendix B

Prior Coverage

Reports

(U) The Government Accountability Office (GAO), DoD IG, Under Secretary of Defense (Intelligence) (USD(I)) and the U.S. Joint Forces Command issued the following reports discussing various aspects of DoD intelligence training and education programs:

GAO

GAO Report No. 11-673 "ARMY AND MARINE CORPS TRAINING Metrics Needed to Assess Initiatives on Training Management Skills," July 2011

GAO Report No. 10-720 "MILITARY TRAINING Army and Marine Corps Face Challenges to Address Projected Future Requirements," July 2010

DoDIG

DODIG-2012-001 "Assessment of Security Within the Department of Defense - Training, Certification, and Professionalization," October 6, 2011

OUSD(I)

OUSD(I), DD-INT(A)2252 "Annual Report of Intelligence and Security Training, Education and Certification," Fiscal Year 2012

OUSD(I), "Fiscal Year 2011 Department of Defense Intelligence Components Annual Training and Education Summary Report Version 1.0," May 9, 2012

OUSD(I) Human Capital Management Office, "Staff Assistance Visit Review of the DoD Intelligence Training and Education Enterprise," April 15, 2009

U.S. Joint Forces Command

"Joint Intelligence Training 2010 Annual Report," January 19, 2011

Appendix C

DoD Intelligence Certification Program

(U) DoD IE leadership stated concerns exist in the DoD IE regarding limited resources, design, implementation, and management of the DoD intelligence functional areas certification program led by the DoD Intelligence Education Board, HCMO. HCMO leadership stated that the intelligence certifications do not guarantee a specific level of work or task performance; however, the projected outcome of the design and implementation of the program is professionalization of the intelligence disciplines and efficiency of leveraging learning resources.

(U) HCMO officials noted that the success of the certification program rests with functional managers in DoD IE. Currently, intelligence professionals are not required to complete the requisite intelligence discipline certification because the certifications are not a DoD IE or IC requirement. HCMO leadership stated that it is not in their authority to mandate that functional managers institutionalize the certification program or hire certification graduates. HCMO officials further noted that only Congress, and to some extent, the DNI have the authority to make the certification program an IC requirement. In addition, interviewees and data call respondents expressed concerns about whether the certification program will ever be carried out in such a manner to foster coordinating DoD Intelligence Training Management. This coordination would allow for performance and efficiency in the DoD IE to know collectively what common fundamental knowledge base and skill sets are shared at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. As the HCMO, OUSD(I) is currently in various stages of development and full implementation has not been completed for the entire DoD IE certification program, DoD IG declined to further address the matters of interest identified to date. However, as the certification process matures we recommended that DoD IG maintain its awareness of the progress and carrying out of the program.

Appendix D

DoD IE Training Governance Policy Guidance

(U) DoD Intelligence Functional Areas series of issuances:

1. DoDI 3305.01, "National Defense Intelligence College," December 22, 2006. *(Incorporating Change 1, February 9, 2011)*
2. DoDI 3305.02, "DoD General Intelligence Training," November 28, 2006. *(Incorporating Change 1, January 28, 2011)*
3. DoDI 3305.09, "DoD Cryptologic Training," December 22, 2006.
4. DoDI 3305.10, "DoD Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT) Training," December 22, 2006.
5. DoDI 3305.11, "DoD Counterintelligence Training," March 19, 2007. *(Incorporating Change 2, October 15, 2013)*
6. DoDI 3305.12, "Intelligence and Counterintelligence (I&CI) Training of Non-U.S. Persons," October 25, 2007. *(Incorporating Change 2, October 15, 2013)*
7. DoDI 3305.13, "DoD Security Training," December 18, 2007.
8. DoDI 3305.14, "Joint Intelligence Training," December 28, 2007. *(Incorporating Change 2, October 15, 2013)*
9. DoDI 3305.15, "DoD Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Training," February 25, 2008. *(Incorporating Change 1, Effective October 15, 2013)*
10. DoDI 3305.16, "DoD Measurement and Signature Intelligence (MASINT) Training," June 12, 2008.
11. DoD Manual 3305.13, "DoD Security Accreditation and Certification," March 14, 2011.
12. DoD Manual 3305.02, "DoD Collection Management (CM) Accreditation and Certification," November 21, 2012.

(U) Joint Training and Education Doctrine series of issuances:

1. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3500.01A, "Joint Training Policy and Guidance for the Armed Forces of the United States," March 15, 2012, establishes Joint Training policy for the Armed Forces of the United States. The instruction defines the CJCS policy for joint training to enhance joint readiness.
2. JSM 5100.01B, June 20, 2001, "Organization and Functions of the Joint Staff"
3. CJCSI 1800.01, "Officer Professional Military Educational Policy," September 5, 2012.
4. DoDD 5105.21, "Defense Intelligence Agency," March 18, 2008.
5. DoDI 3305.02, "DoD General Intelligence Training," November 28, 2006 (Incorporating Change 1, January 28, 2011).
6. CJCSI Guide 3501, June 8, 2012 "The Joint Training System: A Guide for Senior Leaders" describes the Joint Training System as a four-phase iterative set of processes that aligns joint training strategy with assigned missions to produce trained and ready individuals, staffs, and units.
7. DoD Instruction 3305.14, "Joint Intelligence Training (JIT)", December 28, 2007 (Incorporating Change 1, January 28, 2011).

Management Comments

Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence



INTELLIGENCE

OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
5000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-5000

JUL 31 2014

MEMORANDUM FOR INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Response to Draft Report, "Evaluation of DoD Intelligence Training and Education Programs for the Fundamental Competencies of the DoD Intelligence Workforce" (Project No. D2013-DINT01-162.000)

Thank you for the opportunity to review and comment on the subject report. Our comments below are keyed to Recommendation A calling for action by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, (OUSD(I)), Human Capital Management Office:

- Recommendation A. (DoD baseline intelligence standard for fundamental knowledge and basic skills): We concur with Finding A that no training standards have been established for all DoD entry/development level intelligence professionals and that entry-level intelligence training programs across the DoD vary considerably. We do not concur, however, with Recommendation A that OUSD(I) develop, implement and codify in DoD policy a "Common DoD Basic Intelligence Training Course Framework". We recommend that Finding A be reworded to have OUSD(I):
 1. Validate the findings in this report and determine the impacts on DoD intelligence workforce performance using the DoD Intelligence Training and Education Board.
 2. Work with DoD Components, as necessary, to establish skill standards based on a common essential body of knowledge and essential body of work for all entry/developmental intelligence professionals.

Thank you again for giving us the opportunity to comment on the draft report. We look forward to continuing our work with your staff on this matter once the report is finalized. My point of contact is ^{(b) (6)} [REDACTED]

Sara B. Rateliff

Director, Human Capital Management Office



Joint Staff



THE JOINT STAFF
WASHINGTON, DC

Reply Zip Code:
20318-0300

DJSM 0264-14
5 September 2014

**MEMORANDUM FOR OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR
INTELLIGENCE AND SPECIAL PROGRAM ASSESSMENTS**

**SUBJECT: Draft DoD IG Evaluation of DoD Intelligence Training and Education Programs for
the Fundamental Competencies of the DoD Intelligence Workforce**

1. Thank you for the opportunity to review the subject report. Based on a review within the Joint Staff and at the Combatant Commands (CCMDs), the Joint Staff concurs with the report and offers one comment. Responses from the CCMDs, the Services, and the Defense Intelligence Agency are attached for your consideration.
2. Standards for training of the Joint Force are set by the Joint Staff J-7, in conjunction with the Services and stakeholders. Therefore, I suggest that on page 12, Recommendation A.1., where you recommend that the Human Capital Management Office, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, "establish DoD baseline intelligence training requirements," you change the paragraph to read:

"We recommend that the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence develop policy mandating Joint Intelligence standards, including Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment, be incorporated into Defense Intelligence training. Standards should be set by the Joint Staff (JS J-7 and J-2) and implemented by the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency."

3. The Joint Staff point of contact is Rear Admiral Paul Becker, U.S. Navy; Deputy Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff; (b) (6)


DAVID L. GOLDFEIN, Lt Gen, USAF
Director, Joint Staff

Attachment:
As stated

Acronyms and Abbreviations

CJCS	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
CCMD	Combatant Commands
DoD IE	Department of Defense Intelligence Enterprise
DITEB	DoD Intelligence Training and Education Board
DNI	Director of National Intelligence
HCMO	Human Capital Management Office
IC	Intelligence Community
JIT	Joint Intelligence Training
JS	Joint Staff
ODNI	Office of the Director of National Intelligence
OSD(I)	Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence
POA&M	Plans of Action and Milestones
USD (I)	The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence
USJFCOM	United States Joint Forces Command



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